2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

12 May 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2000 outcome on the Middle East Working Paper submitted by Egypt to Main Committee II

1. The presence of an advanced unsafeguarded nuclear programme in the Middle East and the threat posed by such a programme to the security of the region had prompted Egypt and the States of the region to address this issue in several forums from an early date; beginning in the General Assembly in 1974, by calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by calling for the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, as well as at successive review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. Since 1974, the General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and since 1979 has annually adopted resolutions addressing the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

3. The outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consisted of a package of three decisions and one resolution:

- Decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty;
- Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;
- Decision on the extension of the Treaty;
- Resolution on the Middle East. This resolution called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

4. The 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. It also recognized that the resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the

05-34339 (E) 170505

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.

5. Recognizing that all States of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, had acceded to the Treaty, the 2000 Review Conference welcomed the accession by those States and reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

6. Furthermore, the 2000 Review Conference invited all States to issue and transmit declarations of support for establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, to the Secretary-General and to take practical steps towards that objective, and requested all States parties to report to the President of the 2005 Review Conference on the steps they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution. Pursuant to the mandate issued by the 2000 Review Conference to the Secretary-General, a compilation of those reports is contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/15.

7. The outcome of the 2000 Review Conference and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East represent a cumulative result that should be the point of departure for the 2005 Review Conference. At the same time, the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty represents an integrated whole, which would be compromised if any of its components were compromised.

8. Today, in May 2005, Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not acceded to the Treaty or placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

9. During the 2005 Review Conference, the States parties to the Treaty are expected to assess progress towards implementing that resolution since 1995 and the 2000 outcome, and to recommend a course of action for the full realization of its objectives. That task should be entrusted to a subsidiary body of the Conference to be established for that purpose.

10. Egypt believes that the States parties to the Treaty, in their consideration of the implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2000 outcome on the Middle East, should consider progress towards the fulfilment of the 2000 outcome, namely accession by Israel to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

11. The Conference should adopt a commitment of States parties regarding specific actions to be taken during the forthcoming review cycle, given the lack of progress on the part of Israel towards accession to the Treaty or placement of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. Such actions should include:

- Undertaking not to transfer nuclear-related material, technology or information to Israel, notwithstanding prior contracts or commitments;
- Commitment to deny access to nuclear-related facilities and laboratories to scientists and researchers from Israel.

12. States parties should report to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the

status of trade in or transfer of nuclear or nuclear-related material or technology between them and Israel, as well as on the status of scientific cooperation or exchange in the nuclear field during the period preceding each session of the Preparatory Committee and Review Conference. The Secretariat is requested to prepare a compilation of those reports for consideration of this matter at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2010 Review Conference.

13. Furthermore, the Conference should consider appropriate measures to encourage and monitor progress towards realizing the goals of the resolution between successive review conferences, through an appropriate institutional structure of the Treaty that may be exclusively devoted to the Middle East or to a broader institutional arrangement. The measures should include:

- A standing committee that would initiate contacts with Israel and report on progress to successive review conferences and their Preparatory Committee meetings. The committee could be composed of the Chairman or bureau of each session of the Preparatory Committee and the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution;

- A special representative/envoy of the States parties to the Treaty supported by the Secretariat to undertake good offices with Israel on its accession to the Treaty, and report on progress to successive review conferences and their Preparatory Committee meetings.

14. States parties should continue to report through the Secretariat to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps they have taken to promote the achievement of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and of the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference on the Middle East. The Secretariat is requested to prepare a compilation of those reports for consideration of these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2010 Review Conference.

15. It is imperative that a process be institutionalized for the follow-up and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2000 outcome on the Middle East until their objectives are fully realized. Failure to do so will ultimately undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

16 May 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

European Union common approach

Cooperative Threat Reduction-Global Partnership initiative

Working paper submitted by Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union

1. During the preparatory process and the general debate of the Review Conference many delegations, including the presidency of the European Union, have highlighted the importance of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-Global Partnership initiative and its relevance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This concept was also presented to the Conference on Disarmament and to the First Committee of the General Assembly.

2. The following considerations regarding the relevance of the CTR-Global Partnership for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are submitted below to the Review Conference:

(a) The nuclear arms reduction process, which has been developed in the past decades, has brought to the surface the enormous technical and financial problems connected with the actual elimination of nuclear weapons. The CTR-Global Partnership is one of the multilateral efforts aimed at addressing those problems;

(b) Canada, the European Union (and many of its member States on a national basis), Japan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United States of America, and other countries have worked together, in particular under the CTR initiative, to secure and dismantle nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, materials, carriers and infrastructure. The culminating moment of those initiatives took place in Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, when the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) countries announced a "Global Partnership" against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Participants at the Summit pledged to raise up to US$ 20 billion over the following 10 years to address these threats;

(c) At a time when nuclear proliferation is a growing threat to international peace and security and when the risk that terrorists may seek access to nuclear weapons or to nuclear materials adds a new dimension to that threat, the

05-34583 (E) 170505

CTR-Global Partnership is a significant, additional way to accelerate the nuclear disarmament process;

(d) The nuclear component of the CTR-Global Partnership initiative is relevant to the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and strengthens the Treaty both under article VI and under article I. In particular, the de-activation of thousands of nuclear warheads under this programme is to be considered an effective measure relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament;

(e) Many of the measures undertaken under the CTR-Global Partnership, such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, efforts to convert military stockpiles into a form no longer usable in nuclear weapons, respond to the objectives laid down in articles I and II of the Treaty;

(f) The CTR-Global Partnership initiative deals with highly sensitive materials and equipment. The fact that they have become the object of international cooperation enhances transparency and confidence. The initiative thus strengthens trust between States and facilitates the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the preambular part of the Treaty;

(g) The CTR-Global Partnership initiative has facilitated accession to the Treaty by a number of countries, thus strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Other countries may join the initiative both as donors and as recipients.

3. **The Review Conference is invited to recognize the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership.**

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

17 May 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Nuclear Disarmament

Working paper submitted by Canada

Nuclear disarmament has, since the inception of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 35 years ago, been one of its three core commitments constituting the "grand bargain" of the Treaty. The viability of this Treaty depends on these commitments being honoured in deeds and not just words. Collective understandings of what the article VI obligation means in practice have been gradually developed through the Treaty review process. In 1995, the emphasis was on concluding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the fissile material cut-off treaty and the pursuit of "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons". In 2000, there was a further collective agreement on what needed to be done: the so-called 13 Steps, which actually include 18 measures for giving effect to the nuclear disarmament commitment. These steps are not a panacea nor a definitive listing, but they do constitute a common objective benchmark against which to measure progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Consistent, demonstrable progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is what this Treaty needs to maintain its authority. If the credibility of the commitments assumed under this Treaty is compromised, States will gradually make other arrangements to assure their security interests and the resulting world may be a far more dangerous place than it is now. In the words of Mr. ElBaradei, of the International Atomic Energy Agency: "We have come to a fork in the road. Either there must be a demonstrated commitment to move toward nuclear disarmament, or we should resign ourselves to the fact that other countries will pursue a more dangerous parity through proliferation".

In our view, the benchmarks agreed in this forum are crucial for measuring and substantiating the progress the nuclear-weapon States are making in nuclear disarmament. To seek to ignore or circumvent them as mere political commitments of the past is to undermine all the political commitments made in implementation of the Treaty and to cast doubt upon the credibility of engagements entered into by current administrations or Governments. For our part, we do not insist on a rigid adherence to these steps, if nuclear-weapon States believe they have devised better ways of achieving the intent behind the steps. Such adjustments, however, need to

05-34705 (E) 200505

be explained to the Treaty community. We all have a stake in the realization of these nuclear disarmament objectives. Let me take them up in turn:

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Steps 1 and 2): Achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains a top priority for this regime. The Treaty, with its robust verification capacity in the International Monitoring System, represents an effective bar to both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Failure to bring this accord into force gives countries like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a blank cheque for indigenous development of nuclear weapons. The eight Annex II signatories that have not yet ratified should do so without delay if united pressure is going to be brought to bear on the three holdouts who have failed to sign this vital treaty. If there are nuclear-weapon States that still harbour desires to keep the nuclear testing door open, let them be aware that others may exploit that opening if it is not firmly and decisively closed. Existing moratoria on nuclear tests are welcomed signs of restraint, but they can be terminated unilaterally and are no substitutes for a legally binding compact. Let us not delude ourselves — continued stalling on the Treaty imperils the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament enterprise.

Fissile material cut-off treaty/Conference on Disarmament (Steps 3 and 4): Turning off the tap of fissile material production for nuclear weapons is another pressing priority on which no forward movement has been registered since 2000. The Conference on Disarmament had been given a specific mandate by the last Review Conference, which it has completely failed to realize. This is not the fault of the Conference on Disarmament, but of those States which have not yet displayed the political will and flexibility required to adopt an agreed programme of work incorporating negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and discussion of three other priority issues. One of these is the topic of nuclear disarmament, for which again the Conference on Disarmament had a specific request from the membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is no point in this Conference in urging the Conference on Disarmament to take action if some States party to the Treaty then proceed to block the Conference on Disarmament from fulfilling these assignments. All that this accomplishes is to discredit multilateral cooperation on non-proliferation and disarmament with serious repercussions for the integrity of this Treaty. A bankrupt Conference on Disarmament will eventually lead to an insolvent Treaty unless other multilateral channels are found to advance its disarmament agenda.

Irreversibility and verifiability (Steps 5 and 6): To maintain the credibility of the undertaking, movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons needs to be exclusively in one direction: downwards. Dismantled warheads should only be stored for so long as it takes to safely effect their destruction. Verification of disarmament progress is required to provide the necessary confidence to all parties that disarmament undertakings are actually being implemented. Transparency is also crucial, in this regard, to build that general confidence and moreover to ensure that the non-weapon States receive the credit they deserve for the disarmament action they have taken.

United States of America-Russian nuclear reductions and strategic stability (Step 7): As holders of the greatest store of nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia have special responsibilities to lead the way in nuclear disarmament. We welcome the May 2004 decision to cut the current American

nuclear stockpile by almost 50 per cent, and we would encourage the United States to provide a timetable for accomplishing this reduction. We urge Russia to undertake a similar commitment. We applaud the progress being made in reducing deployed strategic warheads under the Moscow Treaty and the provision of more specific information on the number of United States warheads reduced since the Treaty was signed. We urge the parties to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency for the reasons cited above. Specific timetables for reaching the 2012 end state envisaged in the Moscow Treaty and greater specificity as to exactly what that end state will be (we admit a preference for the lower number) would be useful complements to the Treaty. We would also welcome indications from Russia and the United States of how the move to a warhead-based accounting system and the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons (as envisaged in the START III framework), as well as the aim of strategic stability, are to be carried forward over the next five years.

Controls on fissile material (Steps 8 and 10): Given the obvious non-proliferation and disarmament benefits, we would have liked to have seen more significant progress in transferring surplus fissile material from military stockpiles to international controls. We call upon Russia and the United States to reactivate and implement the Trilateral Initiative or an equivalent and for all nuclear-weapon States to place excess military fissile material under IAEA or other international control. These measures are all the more compelling in light of the threat of terrorist acquisition.

Further nuclear disarmament measures (Step 9): All nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to ensure that their actions and pronouncements are compatible with the general movement towards nuclear disarmament. Doctrinal or policy utterances that give the impression that nuclear weapons are being accorded increased importance in respective security policies are anathema to disarmament efforts and give rise to justified concerns as to the sincerity of the commitments entered into. While much attention has been shown to long-range nuclear systems, non-strategic nuclear forces represent no less of a danger. We welcome the information provided by the United States on its full implementation of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, and welcome the similar information from Russia, which we hope will be able to be expressed in numerical, as opposed to percentage, terms in the future. We also urge China to provide information concerning its contributions to nuclear disarmament. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has made a significant contribution to reducing the numbers, types and operational status of nuclear forces. Last year it also provided important transparency about its actions and policies via publication of two fact sheets on its nuclear forces and its promotion of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives. We would welcome even greater engagement between NATO and Russia to build confidence and facilitate progress towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free Europe. Such a goal, of course, cannot be limited to one continent, and we encourage all those in possession of nuclear weapons to work progressively towards their elimination and not provide new impetus to destabilizing arms races.

Reporting (Step 12): If progress on nuclear disarmament is to be credible and credited, it should be properly documented. In our view, all States parties to the Treaty have a responsibility to account for how they are implementing the Treaty, and we welcome those who are doing so. We would like to see this Conference adopt a decision that would make annual reporting to Treaty sessions a requirement

for all members. Given the interrelationship of the Treaty provisions, we would favour reports covering implementation of all aspects of the Treaty. This would represent a modest, but significant, act of participatory democracy by Treaty members and accountability before the Treaty community. We welcome the information on implementation provided by nuclear-weapon States in their statements and applaud Russia and China for conveying this in the form of a report to the Conference. We urge the other nuclear-weapon States to re-package their implementation statements as an official report to this Conference. Reports ensure an official record of the accomplishments of States in carrying out their Treaty commitments and give all a basis for factual comparison in the future. We urge acceptance of this proposal and have provided draft decision language in working paper 39, in the section on reporting.

Verification (Step 13): As mentioned earlier, Canada believes in the value of verification in the realization of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament commitments. Agreements that lack serious verification provisions are essentially only declarations of good intent, subject to changing politico-security perceptions without notice. If agreements concerning sensitive weapons systems or material are to instil confidence among the parties that they are truly being implemented, there should be adequate verification of these accords. We consider that multilateral approaches here add real value to whatever national means might already be available. Recent events tend to bear this out. We also believe that verification efforts under the Treaty should not be only focused on its non-proliferation and peaceful uses aspects, but should include the development of verification techniques that can facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons as well. We applaud the constructive work undertaken by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in this regard and would urge the other nuclear-weapon States to devote similar attention and resources to this problem.

This survey of the progress that has been made on nuclear disarmament in reference to the 13 steps agreed in 2000 suggests the value of having a set of objective benchmarks. Such reference points are not as vulnerable to distortion or subjective evaluation as are vague, general formulas. They are the nuclear-weapon States' friends, not their enemies, and should be treated as such. They tell us what has been achieved during the period under review and what remains to be accomplished in the years to come. One area where work remains to be accomplished, also reflecting engagements accepted in 2000, but not yet realized, is on negative security assurances. Canada supports beginning discussions on codifying negative security assurances on a legally binding basis. Let us all ensure that we advance along the road to a nuclear-free world in a coherent, consistent and transparent manner.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

17 May 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Achieving permanence with accountability

Working paper submitted by Canada

Realizing fully the purposes and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons requires a commitment by all States parties to effect full implementation and ensure the Treaty's overall authority. Achieving permanence with accountability, the concept that underlay the indefinite extension of the treaty, is also a key goal.

Canada proposes that the Review Conference adopt outcomes designed to meet these objectives, by modifying the way we do business and fostering improved transparency and accountability.

Following are the outcomes proposed by Canada:

Meetings

Recalling earlier Review Conference decisions on strengthening the Treaty review process, States parties recognize the need to have a capacity to consider, in a more authoritative and frequent manner, the state of the Treaty's implementation and to respond promptly to challenges to its fundamental purposes.

The States parties agree to meet annually in a one-week Conference of States Parties to consider and decide on any issues covered by the Treaty.

In the two years immediately preceding a Review Conference, the Annual Conference will be extended by one week to carry out the function of a Preparatory Committee. The Preparatory Committee will finalize the procedural arrangements and make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations for that Review Conference.

States parties also agree to establish a standing five-person bureau of the Treaty comprised of the President of the Review Conference and the chairpersons of each of the Annual Conferences, to be elected at the end of each Review Conference with a mandate extending until the subsequent Review Conference. The membership of this bureau will reflect on an equitable basis the United Nations regional groups. The standing bureau will provide continuity and oversight of the Treaty on behalf of its members and is empowered to convene, pursuant to a consensus decision of its

05-34713 (E) 200505

own, extraordinary sessions of the Conference of States Parties when situations arise that threaten the integrity or viability of the Treaty. Such an extraordinary Conference will be convened within two weeks of a State party having submitted a notification of intent to withdraw from the Treaty.

Reporting

The Conference recalls the decision of the 2000 Review Conference on regular reports and recognizes the value of reporting for building confidence in the Treaty regime by promoting transparency and accountability, and providing States parties a way to demonstrate their active commitment to and participation in the implementation of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms the importance of reporting and States parties agree to provide reports on an annual basis on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. Recognizing the interrelationship of the provisions of the Treaty, the Conference encourages States parties to include in their reports implementation actions on all articles of the Treaty.

Civil Society

The Conference welcomes the continuing contributions of civil society and non-governmental organizations to promoting non-proliferation and disarmament, and thus to furthering the objectives of the Treaty, through public education, research and analysis, the mobilization of political will and the promotion of transparency.

The Conference continues to support the effective participation of representatives of non-governmental organizations in Treaty conferences and Preparatory Committee sessions and encourages the further development of rules of procedure and practice, in consultation with representatives of non-governmental organizations, to facilitate and optimize such participation. In accordance with current rules and past practice, representatives of non-governmental organizations are allowed to attend meetings of Treaty conferences and Preparatory Committee sessions, other than those designated as closed; to receive documents; to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants; and to address delegates.

The Conference agrees that open meetings and appropriate seating arrangements for representatives of non-governmental organizations within the meeting rooms are important means of facilitating effective participation.

The Conference agrees to extend the provision for representatives of non-governmental organizations to address sessions including meetings of the Committees and subsidiary bodies.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

17 May 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

The implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working Paper presented by the State of Qatar on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

I. Background

1. The State parties agreed, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to extend the Treaty indefinitely in a package deal consisting of three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East. The Conference undertook to strengthen the Treaty, to achieve its universality, to adopt principles and objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty, and to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

2. During the period between the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, and as a positive development owing to the Middle East resolution and the commitments declared by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the remaining members of the Arab League non-parties to the NPT acceded to the Treaty.

3. Israel remains the only State in the region that has not yet acceded to the Treaty and continues to refuse to place all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

4. The 2000 Review Conference recognized that the 1995 resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. It also recognized that the resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.

5. The 2000 Review Conference welcomed, inter alia, the fact that all the Arab States acceded to the Treaty, and called upon Israel, the only State in the Middle

05-34723 (E) 200505

East which has not done so, to join the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system.

6. The General Assembly, for the twenty-fifth consecutive year, adopted by consensus a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

7. The General Assembly also continued to overwhelmingly support and adopt every year the resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The most recent of these resolutions is resolution 59/106, which expressed concern about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region, noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and reaffirmed the importance of accession by Israel to the Treaty and placement of all its nuclear facilities and materials under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

II. Position and proposals of the States members of the League of Arab States

8. The member States of the League of Arab States believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the core of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and that in spite of the lack of real advancement on its resolution, decisions and outcomes adopted by previous review conferences, they still believe that the 2005 Review Conference is an opportunity to review the operation of the Treaty, to agree on how practically to move towards implementing long-standing obligations, and to strengthen efforts to achieve its universality.

9. Over the span of 30 years, the Arab States sought to transform the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. A number of Arab initiatives were launched, and dozens of resolutions were proposed to different multilateral disarmament forums. It is unfortunate that, in spite of international support for these Arab initiatives, no real practical steps have been taken at the international level to advance the implementation of these resolutions and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

10. It has always been the conviction of the Arab States that the only practical solution to the issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is to adopt a regional approach to the problem through establishing a verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and not through the present State-by-State approach which, from a regional security perspective, is biased and selective.

11. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East sponsored by the three depository States and adopted by consensus, was part and parcel of the package deal of extending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely. The resolution was also the main reason why all the Arab States acceded to the Treaty before the 2000 Review Conference. Israel remains the only State in the region that has not acceded to the Treaty and continues to refuse to place all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the IAEA safeguards.

12. These facts were acknowledged by the 2000 Review Conference that welcomed the accession to the Treaty by all the Arab States, and stressed the importance of accession by Israel, it being the only State in the region that has not done so.

13. The outcome of the 2000 Conference was built on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The point of departure for the 2005 Review Conference should be based on the cumulative result of the outcomes of those two conferences. Taking into consideration that the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons represents an integrated package deal, it is important to note that if the 1995 resolution on the Middle East were compromised, all the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference would be compromised.

14. Ten years have elapsed since the adoption of this resolution and five since the last Review Conference, without any serious attempt by the international community at implementing it. There is no mechanism for its implementation or follow-up.

15. The accession of all the Arab States in the region has not, unfortunately, provided them with the necessary security in the face of the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Israel continues to defy the repeated calls by the international community to accede to the Treaty.

16. All the States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should shoulder their responsibilities by exerting their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the resolution. The role of the three depository States is crucial to assist the Review Conference in elaborating practical steps to ensure the full implementation of the resolution and the realization of its objectives. They have to bring credibility to their actions taken at the 1995 Conference when they sponsored this important resolution.

17. Therefore it is imperative that the Conference, in addition to an unequivocal call demanding that Israel accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State without delay, should take the following steps:

(a) Establish a subsidiary body within Committee II to discuss the implementation of the Middle East resolution and prepare a follow-up mechanism;

(b) Establish a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2005 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular prompt accession by Israel to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and report to the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) Call upon the United Nations to convene an international conference to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East;

(d) Obtain a clear commitment from all the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and not in any way to assist Israel, in a manner that would contribute to its ability to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices under any circumstances;

(e) In conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, all States parties to the Treaty should declare their commitment not to transfer nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, or assistance in the nuclear field to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. This should include a commitment to deny access to nuclear-related facilities and laboratories to scientists and researchers from Israel;

(f) These commitments should be monitored through reports by the States parties to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference. These reports should transparently report on the status of trade in or transfer of nuclear or nuclear-related material or technology between them and Israel as well as on the status of scientific cooperation or exchange in the nuclear field during the period preceding each session of the Preparatory Committee and Review Conference;

(g) The United Nations Secretariat is requested to prepare a compilation of those reports for consideration at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2010 Review Conference.